Right to kill?” “

Heated exchanges characterized the debate at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, gathered in plenary session in Strasbourg from 25 to 29 April. The chamber rejected a draft resolution “on the accompaniment of terminally ill patients”, behind which a form of veiled acceptance of euthanasia was glimpsed. The document, which would have had significant political value , had already been presented and rejected by the assembly of the Council of Europe; in this fourth “attempt”, the parliamentarians, after presenting 71 amendments, finally rejected the resolution with 138 votes against, 26 in favour and 5 abstentions. “PrevenTING ABUSES BY LAW”. The text had been prepared by the Swiss representative Dick Marty (social affairs committee), who asked the 46 member states of the Council of Europe to “define and implement” a “real policy of accompanying terminally ill patients”. The proposals in the document included “the promotion of palliative treatment”, the “strengthening of treatment to alleviate pain” and “the definition of codes of medical ethics to prevent ‘over-treatment’ designed to keep patients alive at any price”. “Only a form of legalization of euthanasia under control – declared Marty himself, in opening the debate – can bring transparency and prevent abuses”, by respecting “patients’ rights in their terminal phase to reject medical treatment” and “freely dispose of their own person”. The Resolution, citing some comparative examples, pointed out the cases in which euthanasia has already been introduced: the Dutch and Belgian legislation. In Denmark passive euthanasia is tolerated, while in France the right to interrupt the treatment of a patient who is suffering, and has no hope of a recovery, is recognized. Marty also insisted on the need to implement strict forms of vigilance in European hospitals, “where clandestine euthanasia is being practised thanks to the absence of any legislation on the matter”. Marty explained that “the aim is not to impose a law equal for everyone: each country must find the most suitable legislative solution”. REJECTING THE “RIGHT TO KILL”. The delegates in the chamber emphasized more than once the fear of “the consequences that the liberalization of euthanasia might cause”, and pointed out its contravention of the European Convention of Human Rights. Kevin McNamara, English parliamentarian, led the “no” front to the resolution, forcefully asserting that to “liberalize euthanasia would be tantamount to recognizing the right to kill”. In his view, “the French situation, that recognizes the right to terminate futile treatment, cannot be compared with the fact of deliberately killing a person. In my view the law must be clear everywhere: no physician must have the possibility of killing patients, nor even taking decisions that would accelerate their death, for example by depriving them of food”. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND BIOETHICS. The Council of Europe had already intervened in 1999 with a resolution against any form of ‘over treatment’ in the case of the terminally ill, and asking instead for full respect of the dignity of the patient. The Strasbourg-based organization frequently promotes public debates and studies on ethical issues linked to health and illness, medical research, and the living conditions of elderly people unable to care for themselves. Not by chance during the same days as the session of the Parliamentary Assembly, a conference of the national Committees of Bioethics organized by the Council of Europe was being held at Dubrovnik, in Croatia (25-26 April). It was followed by a meeting of the Executive Committee for Bioethics of the Council of Europe (26/29 April) on issues of human genetics. a REFLECTION ON FREEDOM TO LIVE. The latest version of the resolution subjected to the vote of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe has also been commented on by Katharina Schauer, expert of COMECE (Commission of the episcopates of the European Community), in an article in its review “Europe Infos”. In her article with the title “Ars moriendi?” Schauer begins by describing the main features of the new report, where a form of “death assistance” had been envisaged for patients no longer able to express their agreement: in such cases the “presumed will” of the patients would be determined “through written statements by the patient or through a ‘therapy representative’ where the patients can no longer express themselves clearly”. But does not this position risk “leading to frequent killings without the will of the persons involved”? Would it not be tantamount to euthanasia, practised without the patient’s agreement? Would it not encourage some to arrogate to themselves the right to judge whether the life of a human being is still worth being lived? Putting to one side the serious ethical and religious objections that could be raised, we would also need – says Schauer – to consider the real consequences of the depenalization of euthanasia and “the pressure that has the potential to be exerted on patients who wish to live, contrary to the opinions of the doctors and/or their families who do not consider their lives worth living”. We would need to consider “our society’s treatment of sickness and death, and our handling of the medical possibilities of the artificial preservation of human life through over-treatment”. We need to reflect on “the limits of strictly technical and medical responses to illness” and how best to “accompany” the dying.