Big and small” “

The real problem of Europe consists not of the fact of “not being a big civil or military power”, but “its lack of leadership. Ever since the Maastricht Treaty, Europe has been idle and proceeds by inertia” and, “in contrast to America, it’s not a State” and “does not possess a strategic view of its own future”. The analysis of ZAKI LAÏDI , researcher at the CERI (Centre for International Studies and Research), is contained in an interview given by the expert to “Études” (www.revue-etudes.com), the review of contemporary culture published by the French Jesuits. The review is celebrating its 150th anniversary this year (1856-2006). In its January number, dedicated to this important anniversary, Laïdi examines the causes of the “weakness of Europe” and tries to suggest some ways out of its predicament. BY THE FORCE OF IDEAS. “The idea that” the old continent could become “a great power, comparable to the USA today or to China in the near future, seems to me very weak”, points out Laïdi, and this, in the first place, is “because Europe is not a State, but a federation of nation-states and, consequently, makes no reference to the existence of a European people. Now, so long as a European people does not exist, it is clear that a European State, or even a common representation of the world and what’s at stake in it cannot exist”. In the view of the scholar, moreover, “the majority of Europeans, Poles and citizens of the Baltic States included, consider that the ultimate defence of their own territory is not their own national competence, but the responsibility of NATO, and hence, de facto, of the Americans. The third element of “weakness” is “the reluctance to use force and the tendency to promote the norm” (i.e. a system of legal provisions), but the norm, explains Laïdi, “is not in contradiction to the development of military force”, which, in turn, is not enough. “The last fifteen years – he continues – demonstrate that the sole recourse to force has solved no problem”. Just one example: “the great strategic event of the twentieth century, the collapse of Communism, was caused not by a war of conquest, but by an implosion of the system”. Ideas, in short, “were shown to be stronger than missiles”. GOVERNANCE AND NORMS. “All depends on the idea we have of the international system – continues Laïdi -. If we are convinced that what matters are force and the interests of States, and not on the contrary values, ideas or movements of opinion, it’s clear, then, that Europe can exert no international influence. If we believe, vice versa, that the problems of the world are never regulated by force alone”, then “the opportunities of the old continent become clear”. This is the question posed by Laïdi: “Are we heading towards a world organized and regulated by norms – according to the European project -, or are we witnessing a return to realpolitik with the increase of the power of China, India and Russia?”. “Europeans – he stresses – are banking on the principle that the generalized norm may govern the world; nonetheless I’m not sure that the other big states share this view”. “The Chinese, for example, want to enter into the ‘court of the big powers’ not to make norms prevail, but to defend their own interests”. Europe, concludes Laïdi, has the task of “trying to convince others to enter into an international system regulated by norms that are valid for everyone, including the most powerful”. TOWARDS HARMONIZATION. In Laïdi’s view, moreover, the European Union is “too absorbed by its own internal questions” to have “a strategic view of its own future”, and has to come to terms with “the difficulties of national systems to adjust to the pressures of globalization, the tendency to re-nationalize political decisions, and the temptation to see Europe more as a constraint than an opportunity”. For the new member states “entry into the EU – he adds – represented the opportunity to regain a political sovereignty undermined by the Soviet ideology, but the idea of shared sovereignty, which is at the heart of the European project, does not represent for them a self-sufficient idea. If they are willing to admit it at the economic level, they do not in the least hope to see it applied in the social or diplomatic fields”. “They look to Europe – continues Laïdi -, not so much as a project, but rather as a aid to help them re-enter the national power politics of the continent”. The scenario of Europe is complex: Laïdi cites as an instance “the Franco-British rivalries” and the conviction “of the British that Europe is altogether too small to tackle the global problems, and yet too big to tackle the local challenges”. But the final message of Zaki Laïdi is one of albeit cautious optimism: “Nothing is immutable and the announcements of the death of Europe penned too hastily by some commentators seem unconvincing”. According to Laïdi, “problems and inequalities remain, but, at the same time, there is also a vocation to overcoming them. I think, for example, that the disparity between the ‘two Europes’ will be far less than it is today in ten years’ time: the factors of harmonization exist in the continent and – he warns – must not be ignored”.