An expected step

Following the appeal-hearing in Strasbourg past June 30, the European Court for Human Rights is in the process of issuing the ruling on the display of the crucifix in public schools. It will take from six to twelve months. In the meantime the theme of the display of the crucifix in state-run schools is the object of reflections and debates in different environments with different interlocutors. To this regard, SIR Europe met Venerando Marano, Ecclesial Law Professor and coordinator of the juridical and legislative Observatory of the Italian Bishops’ Conference. The interview follows.With reference to the audience of the petitioners at the European Court for Human Rights it has been written that as relates to the issue of the display of the crucifix in public schools the Court will judge itself, namely its authority and institutional credibility are at stake. How far do you agree with this statement? “The Court of Strasbourg enjoys a certain degree of authority and credibility which grew in time, thanks to the role played since its establishment for the defence of the rights guaranteed by the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of fundamental Human Rights. It’s important to prevent its authority from being questioned by decisions such as the one on the display of the crucifix, which appears to disregard what had been envisaged by the 1949 statute of the Council of Europe on the founding Countries governments’ obligation to fulfil the ‘moral and spiritual values, which constitute the common heritage of its peoples and the foundations of their principles of liberty … on which true democracy reposes’, along with ‘the common heritage of traditions and ideals’ put down in the introduction of the same Charter on fundamental rights. This decision is marked by technical flaws and ideological constraints – clearly indicated in the defense memorandum submitted by the Italian government – calling for a re-examination by the Grande Chambre, in respect of the subsidiarity principle which remains a critical factor for Europe’s fair future development”.The European Court reminded Italy that the display of the crucifix in schoolrooms refers to regulations dating back to Fascist rule. What is the “message” of this reminder? And what could be the answer? “The ruling issued by the Court of Strasbourg past November links the presence of the crucifix in classrooms to the confessional neutrality of the State. It’s a mistaken reference, since the regulations to this regard do not derive from the confessional principle provided for in art. 1 of the Albertine Statute – in reality immediately stripped of its content as a consequence of dispositions providing for Italian separatism starting in 1848 -. Rather, it is the result of the decisions of the liberal State, confirmed in the constitutional period. Such choices value the importance of the symbol of the Crucifix in Italian tradition and identity, which doesn’t prevent the possibility of encountering and accepting diversity, and which at the same time cannot be sacrificed in the name of this encounter. Dialogue and encounter don’t envisage this sacrifice, indeed, they can be promoted by a conscious identity which doesn’t need to claim a specific realm but is self-affirmed, and tends towards maintaining a link, seeking a point of convergence with different experiences and cultures”. The ongoing appeals and references to State secularity, as is the case of the display of the crucifix in schoolrooms and public buildings appears like an ideological entrenchment which affects also judges and legislators. Why aren’t the European States and the U.S. taken as examples of “positive secularity”?“The reference to State secularity at times is instrumental, it reveals ideological interpretations and fuels misunderstandings on the content and bearing of this principle. To this regard, Italy’s juridical experiences have a specific trait, which was disregarded by the Court for Human Rights. Such peculiarity, which is prevailing across European environments, presents a form of secularity, which notwithstanding the distinction and autonomy of the temporal sphere from the spiritual sphere, doesn’t imply privatizing religion or excluding it from the public sphere, namely, it’s not a question of State indifference for religion. Rather, it implies the ‘protection of religious freedom, in a regime of cultural and confessional pluralism’ (Const. Court n. 203/1989). In a context which fully provides for the freedom of expression of all religions, the idea of a neutral State called to impose the absence of religious symbols in public places instead of being the expression of pluralism in a democratic society risks turning into its negation. In order to avoid this risk it is necessary to reaffirm a concept of laity which doesn’t antagonize religious experience, but which is open and pacified, a ‘laity of respect’, rather than of contrast, which draws inspiration from the principles of mutual recognition and dialogue between believers and non-believers”.