The Scottish lesson? ” “Immediate devolution

The United Kingdom stays as it is. The Referendum called to mark Scotland’s independence was defeated by a no-vote (55% noes, 45% yes-votes). Sighs of relief by the unionists were joined by those in London. In the end, the outcome of the popular vote of September 18 was the same envisaged in opinion polls and predicted by experts, but the political debate in Great Britain sparked off suddenly and unexpectedly in the two weeks ahead of the referendum, when polling institutes started to detect a growth in pro-independence voters, until some of the surveys predicted a majority vote, over the 50% threshold. At that point the English ruling class had an abrupt wake-up call and understood that perhaps it was time to starting taking seriously an electoral occasion which was to decide “only” about national integrity. The party of Alex Salmond, the Scottish Prime Minister who strongly wanted the referendum, conducted an effective communication campaign which never fell into foul talk, demonization of the opponent, or bad language. For this reason, Edinburgh’s good-faced nationalism managed to obtain the attention of a large population bracket in Scotland that longs for greater autonomy from London in terms of taxation, a better welfare system and that observes the current condition of the European Union with remarkable scepticism. In all likelihood, if the referendum had included a third option providing strong autonomy without full separation, it would have gained a large majority of votes. This was the focus of the communication campaign of English political leaders – conservatives and Labour alike. Having underestimated the importance of the referendum, before the unexpected outcome of the last surveys, Conservative British Premier David Cameron, and his opponent Ed Milibrand, leader of the Labour party, mobilized all media channels promising a devolution of powers to Scotland, much greater than it is today, with the aim of weakening the proposal of Scottish independence campaigners whilst scaring Scottish and European voters with the possible scenarios ensuing a negative outcome of the referendum. Indeed, one of the most prominent features, detected by external observers of the campaign conducted by both fronts, is the superficiality with which such an important theme is often addressed. Although in theory there were a set of crucial aspects at stake on both sides, tautological discourse prevailed, such as “we must remain united because we must remain united”, while fundamental questions, such as those regarding the currency of an independent Scotland, remained hanging. All considered, also in the United Kingdom, as in a large part of Europe, strong politics marked by closeness to citizens, ideals, in-depth reflections and major projects, seem a distant memory. Even when citizens’ claims are evident, the tendency is to make an instrumental and superficial use of those claims. Politics often seems to react to widespread fears (of the present, of the future…) rather than guiding citizens to dominate them, while the economy is reconfirmed as the compass and the centre of all political debates. In any case, the Scottish referendum has been a useful occasion to bring to the fore the discontent that is worming its way through the continent. If next year English politicians want the Scots to vote in favour of increased devolution, its consequences could impact also the constitutional plane.