editorial" "
The end of the war in Iraq is in sight. And with it a whole series of unsubstantiated forecasts about its possible consequences are crumbling. However, at a time when the wounds produced by the war are slackening, it would be a big mistake not only from the moral viewpoint, but also from the most elementary geopolitical perspective not to bear in mind that the most important thing is not the distribution of the benefits that may derive from the contracts that may be signed with the new Iraqi administration, or a possible growth of stock market indexes, something about which it is legitimate to have very strong doubts, unless the three focal points of the great triangle of world economic development Germany, USA and Japan undertake deep structural changes, of which there is still no trace anywhere, or unless they achieve some spectacular growth in productivity, and not even that is likely in the short term. Not even the Iraqi oil reserves, however important, may alter in any significant measure the trend of the world hydrocarbons market. What is of interest at this time is to closely monitor the way three questions are evolving. The first is the rift in Europe. The conflict in Iraq has meant that the rift in Europe’s approaches to international affairs, that became evident following the Suez crisis, has widened. In 1956 the Americans imposed a ceasefire on the Anglo-French troops on the Suez Canal. Great Britain then decided that its international policy should never have entered into conflict with that of the USA. France, for her part, decided to contribute to the construction of Europe, in rivalry with North America. Both positions have been maintained intact ever since. But the war in Iraq gave rise to the deepest crisis that has ever been registered in the conflict between them. As is obvious, this situation paralyses the process of the unification of Europe, which is a matter of the utmost gravity. Everything that can be done to re-establish dialogue, and reconcile the two positions, will however be insufficient. The second question to be resolved is the rebirth of North American economic nationalism, with its very serious protectionist consequences. The USA has reacted with dread to the fact that it closed 2002 with a current accounts deficit of 503,400 million dollars, and that the OECD estimates that its 2002 budget deficit will be equivalent to at least 3.1% of its GDP. A situation has been created in which US foreign debt has reached the astronomic figure of three billion dollars. Dreading its consequences, the Americans are now trying to buy as little as possible abroad. They have now firmly embarked on this course. The World Trade organization has condemned this conduct, but there are no signs of a change of route. Thirdly, there’s the question of Iraq, which needs to be set in the wider context of the Mediterranean balance of power. The European Union, and in some sense the whole world, requires that a region so essential for the tranquillity of the international community may find peace and not be subjugated. A necessary – though clearly not sufficient – condition for this is that its standard of living should rise in a significant way. In the specific case of Iraq, its life expectancy in 2000 was 61.7 years in the male population 76 in Italy and 64.7 in the female population 82.4 in Italy. Its per capita GDP was equivalent to 1,131 dollars in 1998, corresponding to 6.4% of the Italian GDP in the same year. This obliges us to plan a completely new trade policy; for example, not to put into cold storage the plans aimed at the creation of a free trade area in the Mediterranean, approved by the EU at Barcelona -, as well as a generous policy of credits and very substantial inputs of aid for the Iraqi people, who had a lower per capita GDP in 1998 than they had in 1950.
