From the Cold War ” “to the cold peace

In the past months Ukraine has become one of the hottest area in terms of international relations. On closer view, it is surprising that the issue wasn’t in the world limelight earlier. In fact, it suffices to look at its position on a map, to realize that it clearly embodies one of the unsolved questions of the international system created in the aftermath of the Cold War, still undergoing transformations. It relates to the hanging relations between Russia and various Western players: the United States, the EU and NATO. Before the exacerbated stand of the US towards Russia and the latter’s exclusion from the G8, some observers evoked a return to the Cold war and to the state of permanent tension that characterized that period, and understandably so. However, it is precisely the differences compared to that stage of international relations which lie at the origin of the tensions and the dangers of the past weeks. Before 1989, the two superpowers and their allies knew exactly what had to be done and which political manoeuvres were absolutely forbidden. If not, the global balance would be at risk. Today the situation is structurally different, and the limits to the actions, interests and responsibilities of world powers are no longer as clear, sometimes not even to the same superpowers are. In the first phase of the post-bipolar international system a certain amount of unsolved issues and errors of assessment were understandable and there was no risk of irreparable consequences because the United States had grown into the first authentic global power, capable of intervention, the winner in the clash that has deadlocked the world for over half a century. From the early 1990s the international system underwent constant transformations, and although it has not yet reached a permanent shape, it is gradually moving towards a plurality of poles of power that claim a role along with their own spheres of influence and safety. Given this situation, structural constraints – the limits under everyone’s eyes to see – back down, the range of possible options increases while political leaderships grow stronger along with the chances of dangerous misunderstandings. This situation evokes those historical periods when some superpowers confronted each other to divide up world resources among themselves whilst ensuring their own security. In reality, although this comparison is not completely appropriate since the destructive power available to the main players is far greater than it was at the time, and because the liberal-democratic governments at the lead in many world Countries partly changed the relations between politics and war. Moreover, the ongoing talks between Russia and the United States on the future of Ukraine that envisage a “neutralization” of the State, that would officially become a buffer-zone between Moscow and the Western world, is at the same time wise and founded on Nineteenth century criteria. It would thereby clarify one of the geopolitical question marks inherited by the Cold War whilst staving off the spectre of an armed conflict, which should everyone’s priority. Regardless of the result of the negotiations, two other knots are bound to remain unsolved. First of all the problem of setting a limit beyond which it become necessary to respond if an excessively “nineteenth century” superpower decide to carry out annexation campaigns motivated by blatantly spurious security reasons. Second, the role of the EU is yet to be defined. If it finally became a “different” superpower, capable of involving the other poles with ties based on mutual trust and not on the logic of power, then the gravity of the other hanging issue might be toned down. But time runs short and Europe can no longer postpone the time of re-awakening, in various areas.